Chairside: what cold outreach actually returns

A scenario model priced off published benchmarks and our own measured data. The only input is how many emails we send a day.

Rates are published benchmarks, each cited with the population it was measured on; the two rates nobody publishes are flagged as assumptions. Every number below is generated by deck/lib/model.mjs from deck/inputs.json: change an assumption, re-run, and the deck updates. The product itself is built and running: 25 pages, 49/49 server checks, 36/36 browser checks against a live stack.

The price is published rather than quoted, computed by the checkout from a single table, and the refund is automatic on request. No contract, no lock-in, no discovery call to learn what it costs.

The model takes one input: cold emails sent per day. Revenue is then a product of rates we can measure and rates we have to assume.

Published list prices, read off each provider's own pages, with the policy language that decides whether the volume is usable at all.

What the Hostinger route actually buys, and how much of it is usable for cold outreach.

Two separate jobs, two separate pieces of infrastructure, because they have opposite rules.

Infrastructure is not the constraint and never will be at this scale: it is 4.4% of gross at a thousand emails a day, and it stays under a tenth of gross at every volume in this model. Every dollar of outcome comes from the two rates at the end of the funnel, which no provider can sell us and no price list can improve.

Source: NPPES full data dissemination file, Aug 2026 (npidata_pfile_20050523-20260809), CMS public domain · 12 state licence boards matched to the federal spine; 76.4% of the sampled 12-state set; 17.4% of federally-active dentists are not licensed to practise · the gate: no verified address exists for any record yet. Free-method enrichment resolves a website for ~9% and an email for ~2.5% of practices (Colorado pilot, 1,495 practices)

Two of the three most powerful steps are assumptions, not benchmarks. That is the honest state of this business: the reply rate is measured across the industry, but nobody publishes a rate for selling a $25 preview to a dental practice, because nobody else does it. Those are the numbers this model exists to test, and the first 25 orders will price them.

That column is the whole model: twelve months of it is $1,930 net in the base case. Every assumption behind it carries its own tag, and the two unmeasured ones sit at the end of the line.

Most-quoted cold-email figures come from companies that sell cold-email software: treated as ranges, not measurements.

The conservative case is deliberately unpleasant: it is the industry's average reply rate applied to a list we have not verified yet, with the lowest plausible willingness to buy.

Net of Stripe, sending and review labour. Twelve months from a standing start, no trial or pilot pull-forward.

The recurring line is small by design: no contract, cancel anytime, and only the top tier carries a monthly fee.

Each bar moves one factor between its conservative and optimistic value while everything else stays at base, at 500 emails a day. The reply rate and the preview-to-purchase rate dominate; churn on the $25/mo line is almost irrelevant by comparison, because the monthly line is a small share of revenue. Argue about the top two, not the rest.

The renderer itself is free and fast; the bottleneck is a human checking every claim before a practice sees it, which is deliberate, because the pitch collapses the moment a preview claims something the practice never said. The optimistic case at 1,000 emails a day returns exactly the same money as at 500, because capacity eats the rest.

Read those together: 67 hours a year is a part-time job created by volume. The margin stays high, but the business stops being passive long before it stops being profitable.

The technical ceiling is what the provider allows. Usable for cold is what the policy position and the warm-up practice allow. They are not the same number.

A mailbox estate cannot spend its quota on day one: mailboxes warm, and a domain has a ceiling no matter how many mailboxes sit on it.

The dashed lines are the two phases of the published warm-up. The flat line is today. Everything above it is either paid for in money or paid for in terms.

Ranked by sales per dollar and per unit of effort, using the model rather than an opinion.

Two of those moves cost nothing and one costs twenty dollars a month. The order matters: buy the volume first, because it multiplies everything else, and fix the price second, because it is what each of those sites is worth.

Measured across two large cold-email datasets: most of the interest arrives after the first message, and we currently stop before it.

The same dataset shows email is the weakest channel and the strongest trigger source is already free.

Published list prices from named dental vendors, read off their own pricing pages.

Same outreach, same conversion rates, one line changed: the monthly fee. Nothing else in this deck moves the numbers this much.

At 150-400 dollars a patient a new patient, the pay-for-itself test is one new patient a month for a $250 plan and two for a $500 plan. That is the entire sales argument, and it is a stronger argument than the website ever was, because it is measured against what the practice already spends.

The same 274,895-record asset can be licensed by territory rather than sold site by site. Our own pricing rule puts a territory licence at $1,500-$6,000 a year, with national and DSO licences at $10,000+.

The licence line is illustrative and flagged as an assumption: one territory sale per 200 interested replies, at a $2,500 average licence. It is here because it changes what the same outreach is worth, and because the two products do not compete for the same buyer's attention in the same email only if we decide not to put them there.